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NOTES
SHARING PLANS-APCOMMUNITY PROPERTY-PROFIT
PROVAL OF UNDISCOUNTED CURRENT ACTUAL VALUE
AND DISTRIBUTION BY PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED BY
LIEN ON SEPARATE PROPERTY. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M.
345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).

INTRODUCTION

The judicial practice of dividing spousal pension and retirement
benefits upon divorce is founded in the basic concept that marriage is
a 50-50 partnership. This concept requires an equitable distribution
of all "partnership" assets upon divorce.' The average American family spends most of its income on necessities and niceties with little
left over for investment and savings in anticipation of retirement.
Consequently, many types of public and private retirement plans,2 including profit-sharing plans, have come into being to secure adequate
funds for future needs and to help mitigate financial hardship during
retirement. 3 Accordingly, the courts now recognize that an interest
in an employee retirement plan may constitute a major asset.4 In
Ridgway v. Ridgway,5 the pension concerned was a profit sharing
plan. This Note will discuss the methods 6 used by the trial court, and
approved by the New Mexico Supreme Court, for valuing and dividing
the plan benefits upon divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petitioner, Linda Ridgway, filed an action in the District
Court, Eddy County, for dissolution of marriage, division of commu1. The services of a wife as homemaker, mother and career-builder for her husband are
no longer regarded as strictly labor of love. The homemaker's claim is that but for her services the family breadwinner would not have been free to concentrate on his career and to
earn his salary and acquire fringe benefits. Hence, the husband's efforts were only part of
the total partnership commitment which produced the assets, including pension benefits.
See Foster and Freed, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J. Fain. L. 187
(1977-78).
2. For a listing and analysis of the principal types of retirement plans, see Pattiz, In a
Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, 5 Pepperdine L. Rev. 191, 271 (1978).
3. See Bonavich, Allocation of Private Pension Benefits as Property in Illinois Divorce
Proceedings, 29 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 2 (1979).
4. See Thiede, The Community Property Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private Employee Retirement Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L. Rev. 635 (1975).
5. 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749(1980).
6. Neither the use of current actual value nor the installment method of division of pension benefits pursuant to a promissory note had previously been recognized as an available
alternative for New Mexico trial courts and so they were new methods in that sense.
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nity property, and child custody and support. 7 Linda and Lance
Ridgway had been married for slightly over six years. During that
time, they acquired, among other community property, a vested but
unmatured interest in a private profit-sharing plan with Southwestern
Engineering and Machining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
SEMCO), Lance's employer. 8
The trial court determined that the interest in the profit-sharing
plan was community property and had a total current cash value of
$23,425.74.' The wife's share was held to be $11,712.87. The court
did not discount her interest because her husband had the immediate
right to such monies upon his termination of employment with
SEMCO for any reason and his estate had the immediate right upon
his death.' o Because neither the community nor the husband had
sufficient cash or equivalent assets to effect immediate payment, he
was ordered by the trial court to execute a promissory note for the
wife's share of community assets'' payable to her over approximately three
years.' 2 The note was secured by a lien on his separate
1
property. 3
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's use of undiscounted current actual value of plan benefits
where present value is not ascertainable.' 4 It also approved of the
promissory note installment payment procedure used for dividing the
benefits.
OVERVIEW OF PENSION AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS AS
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The decision in Ridgway is the most recent step in the development of the judicial treatment in New Mexico of pension plans upon
divorce. The trend toward including spousal pension plans in community property is best illustrated by the California cases.' ' Prior to
1976, the California courts had held that nonvested pension rights
7. Record, vol. 1, at 1-3, Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).
8. Record, vol. 1, at 51, 52.
9. Id. at 52.
10. Id.
11. The wife's interest in other community property was added to her interest in the
profit-sharing plan for a balance of $14,203.64 payable under the note. Id. at 52-54. An option to reduce the note to $10,000.00 after making a cash down payment was available to
respondent. Record, vol. 1, at 64-66.
12. Installments were to be paid at the rate of $250.00 per month until paid in full and
bearing no interest until default. Record, vol. 1, at 54, 55.
13. Record, voL 1, at 55.
14. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).
15. The two California cases referred to infra have been the most commonly cited cases
in this area of the law.
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were not property interests, but were mere expectancies, and thus
not community assets. I6 For example, in French v. French,' ' decided in 1941, a nonvested right in a Navy retirement plan was held
to be an expectancy, not a property interest, and thus not subject to
division as community property. In more recent decisions, however,
the California courts have recognized that pension rights, whether
vested or nonvested, do constitute property interests.' 8 Hence, to
the extent that interests in pensions plans derive from employment
during coverture, they are divisible community assets.
Thirty-five years after French, in the leading case of In re Marriage
of Brown," 9 the California Supreme Court overruled French, concluding that French and its progeny had erred in characterizing nonvested pension rights as expectancies and had thus wrongly denied
the trial courts the authority to divide such interests as community
property." The Brown court ruled that the trial court, when dividing
nonvested pension rights as community property, may award each
spouse an appropriate portion of each pension payment as it is paid,
if it concludes that the uncertainties affecting vesting or maturation
of the pension make it unwise to attempt to divide the present value
of the rights.2
In New Mexico, the question of the disposition of retirement or
pension benefits in divorce proceedings was first addressed in LeClert
v. LeClert.22 In that case, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
retirement benefits, which had vested on account of the length of the
husband's service in the Navy, constituted community property to
the extent that the benefits were acquired during coverture. 13 In
Otto v. Otto, 2 4 the supreme court ruled that the character of retirement pay is determined by the law of the state where it is earned.
property state durThus, if retirement pay is earned in a community
2
ing coverture, it is community property. s
The question of "maturing" of benefits was not at issue before the
16. French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 755, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
17. 17Cal. 2d755, 112P.2d235(1941).
18. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976);
In re Marriage of Carl, 67 Cal. App. 3d 542, 136 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1977); In re Marriage of
Roesch, 81 Cal. App. 3d 367, 146 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1978).
19. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
20. This change in characterization from an expectancy to a form of property came
about because a close analysis of pensions showed them to be part of the consideration
earned by the employee, to which the employee had a contractual right or a choice in action
which translates as a form of property. Id.
21. Id.
22. 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969).
23. Id.
24. 80 N.M. 331, 455 P.2d 642 (1969).
25. Id.
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New Mexico Supreme Court until it decided Copeland v. Copeland,2 6
The supreme court held in that case that a vested but unmatured
pension plan should be divided so as to entitle the non-employee
spouse to a share of the community interest in the portion of the
plan that was earned during coverture.' 7 In Copeland, the trial court
adopted a flexible approach whereby the trial court's choice of either
an immediate division of the pension assets or a "pay as it comes in"
system would depend upon whether there were sufficient community
assets to cover the immediate division of the pension.' 8
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
The two main issues addressed by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Ridgway were the division of the community property and the valuation of the profit-sharing plan.' 9 Several of the problems encompassed by these issues were not reconciled by the court.
Division of Community Property
Several alternative methods are available for dividing pension benefits. Of the five methods mentioned below, only two were available
to the court in Ridgway. Ideally, an immediate division upon divorce
would be effected by a lump-sum payment to the non-employee
3
spouse of actual plan benefits, when plans are vested and matured. 0
When actual benefits cannot be reached an immediate division is still
possible, either by using community or separate property of the employee spouse as an offset 3 ' or by allowing the employee spouse to
borrow half of the actual plan benefits, satisfy the other spouse's interest with the funds, and relinquish his future right to receive the
borrowed benefits from the plan. 3 2 When an immediate division is
26. 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978).
27. The court reserved decision on whether unvested retirement benefits properly
should be considered community property, because it was confronted only with benefits
which were vested. Id. at 412, 575 P.2d at 102.
28. 91 N.M. at 414, 575 P.2d at 104.
29. Child custody was also dealt with by the Supreme Court, but it is of no significance
to this Note.
30. Immediate allocation of assets offers advantages of terminating the litigation and
thereby avoiding problems associated with continued economic entanglement of former
spouses and continued judicial supervision. For a detailed presentation of the pros and cons
of immediate versus "wait and see" allocations see Bonavich, Allocation of Private Pension
Benefits as Property in Illinois Divorce Proceedings,supra note 3, at 31-33.
31. The New Mexico Supreme Court clearly indicated its preference for an immediate
division of unmatured benefits when sufficient assets exist. Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M.
at 414, 575 P.2d at 104.
32. This method was utilized in Hines v. Sands, 312 S.W. 2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
In Hines, the trustees of an employee profit-sharing trust paid the ex-wife half of the employee's share of nonforfeitable trust benefits and in return the employee surrendered his
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not possible, as in Ridgway, the trial court has two alternatives-the
promissory note method or the "pay as it comes in" system. Where a
present or current actual value is ascertainable, yet sufficient assets
for an immediate division cannot be obtained, an installment or delayed payment method may be used by ordering a promissory note
in favor of the non-employee spouse. 3 1 The second alternative where
sufficient assets for immediate division are not available, or the only
alternative when neither present nor current actual value is ascertainable, is the "pay as it comes in" system.3 4
The court in Ridgway first considered the husband's argument that
the trial court's method of dividing community property was an invasion of his separate property rights and tantamount to an award of
alimony. 35 In comparing alimony and community property division,
the supreme court noted that an alimony award is discretionary with
the trial court and can be granted, even if it is not specifically requested, in an effort to divide community property equitably. 36 The
court determined, however, that in the instant case the distribution
to the wife was of her share of community property, and was not alimony.3 7

The husband contended that the trial court invaded his separate
property by ordering him to execute a promissory note in favor of
his wife and secure it with a lien on his residence, which was separate
property. 38 The husband had to make the note payments out of his
future earnings because otherwise he did not have enough community
benefits. In Ridgway, the respondent's ability to obtain loans from the plan was limited by
ERISA because of his position as a trustee. Record, vol. 3, at 28-30, Ridgway v. Ridgway,
94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).
33. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. at 346, 610 P.2d at 750. The trial court apparently
adopted the promissory note method at the suggestion of counsel for the petitioner. Record, vol. 3, at 15-16, 24-27.
34. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639;
Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. at 414, 575 P.2d at 104. For a recent study indicating that
the courts have become increasingly prone to favor a "when, as and if" division in situations
where a pension is too difficult to value or where sufficient assets for an offsetting exchange
do not exist, see Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic
Relations Law and Retirement Plans, supra note 2, at 250-5 1.
35. 94 N.M. at 346, 610 P.2dat 750.
36. Id. Even though alimony was not specifically requested in the pleadings, where the
wife's prayer for relief asked for equitable division of community property then an alimony
award to her was proper in the amount that community property awarded the husband exceeded that awarded the wife. See Worland v. Worland, 89 N.M. 291, 551 P.2d 981 (1976).
The statutory authority for allowance from a spouse's separate property as alimony is set
forth in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-12 (1978).
37. Once the basis has been established for finding that the award would be proper if it
had been alimony, the basis is without purpose when it is then characterized as community
property.
38. Record, vol. 1, at 51-55 and Brief-in-Chief for Appellant at 4, Ridgway v. Ridgway,
94 N.M. at 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).
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or separate property to pay her.' 9 Clearly, his future earnings constitute separate property. 4" Regarding the lien imposed by the trial
court on his separate property, the husband argued that the trial
court had exceeded its legal authority. Although previously the invasion of a spouse's separate property was allowed only when statutorily authorized for alimony or child support, 4 1 the supreme court
warranted a new usage of the trial court's inherent power by allowing
it to impose a lien on one spouse's separate property to secure a debt
owed to the other spouse.4 2
While the supreme court stated that imposition of a lien in no way
changed the status of the husband's separate property,4 it overlooked a "value" argument that the lien affects salability of the property and its value as security. Insofar as the lien does not vest title in
the wife and it is consistent with the passing of fee, it does not
change the property status. Nevertheless, it is an incumbrance on the
property which diminishes its value. The effect of this incumbrance
is the same as if the court had transferred to the wife a portion of the
husband's separate property equal in value to the diminution caused
by the lien. As a practical matter, if the trial court had not imposed
the lien, the wife could herself have obtained a lien on all real estate
owned by the husband by following the statutorily prescribed procedure for a money judgment creditor. 4 4 In sum, the supreme court
authorized imposition of a lien on the husband's separate property,
but it ignored the argument that the husband's separate property was
invaded without statutory authority both by requiring him to make
payments to the wife out of his future earnings and by decreasing the
value of his separate property. 4"
The above-mentioned disparities in Ridgway may to some extent
be balanced by the trial court's concern for adequately protecting
the wife's interest.4 6 Because of the fact that the profit-sharing plan
in question was established and to be administered by a corporation
consisting of the appellant, his mother, his stepfather, and several
other stockholders, 4" it was suggested that the stock might be dissipated so as to erode the wife's share. 4 ' Also, because the plan was
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Brief-in-Chief for Appellant at 6.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-8(A)(1) (1978).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40-4-12 to -20 (1978).
94 N.M. at 346, 610 P.2d at 750.
Id.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-1-6 (1978).
94 N.M. at 346, 610 P.2d at 750.
Record, voL 3, at 11.
Record, vol. 2, at 71.
Record, vol. 3, at 24.
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subject to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 4 9 the court was reluctant to subject plan benefits in the trust
to attachment or other legal or equitable process so as to directly
secure the wife's interest in the benefits.' 0
Had the "pay as it comes in" method been utilized in Ridgway, the
problems involved in invading the husband's separate property would
have been avoided. The former spouses would have received their respective shares in the plan benefits at the same time-when and if the
plan administrators distributed the benefits. However, the problem
of how to enforce a delayed payment method of division would still
be present. A lien could be imposed on the husband's separate property, just as under the promissory note method.'5
A constructive
trust with the husband acting as trustee might have been established
to receive any benefits of the plan as they were paid.' 2 Additionally,
the court could have required the husband to put up a bond to cover
the wife's share. Another enforcement tool available was a periodic
accounting required of the employee spouse and possibly the employer as well, if permissible under ERISA.5 "
Valuation of Profit-sharingPlan
At least three basic methods exist for valuing pension and profitsharing plans. A determination may be made of either present value 4
current actual value' s or a certain portion of the plan's future value
49. 29 U.S.C. § § 1001-1461 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter referred to as
ERISAI.
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(b) (1978). A recent treatment of ERISA limitations
on court enforcement of spousal pension division is contained in Bonavich, Allocation of
Private Pension Benefits as Property in Illinois Divorce Proceedings, supra note 3, at 33-45.
See also Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, supra note 2, at 253-54.
51. See text accompanying note 42 supra. The trial court originally intended to use the
plan benefits (when, as, and if paid) as collateral security for the indebtedness in Ridgway,
but decided against doing so apparently due to the ERISA limitations on the plan. Record,
vol 3, at 22-27 & 30, Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).
52. The tax consequences of such a trust were examined in Bell, Tax Planningin Divorce,
20 S.W.L.J. 726, 736 (1966).
53. See Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, supra note 2, at 25 2-54.
54. As the supreme court in Ridgway interpreted the Copeland approach to valuation,
trial courts must apply the present value method where a state retirement plan is part of the
community property and that value is ascertainable by substantial evidence. Ridgway v.
Ridgway, 94 N.M. at 347, 610 P.2d at 751. It is noted that ERISA has its own methods for
computing the present value of plan benefits under the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) which promulgated regulations describing the methods. 29 C.F.R. § § 2610.126 10.10 & appendices (1980).
55. Id.
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In discounting to reach the

present value, relevant contingencies and other factors of the particular plan should be considered. Included among those factors are dis9
counting for interest,' ' discounting for mortality, 8 and vesting,
6
6
tax consequences, 0 optional pay-outs, 1 the possibility of early retirement, 6 2 and other features affecting value and capable of calculation which may present themselves in a particular pension or profit-

sharing plan. Some of these factors, such as tax consequences and
optional pay-out on termination of employment, may be relevant in
6
discounting current actual value as well. '
In considering the valuation of the profit-sharing plan, the supreme

court ruled that the trial court's application of the undiscounted current actual value was correct despite the trial court's loose usage of
6
the term "present value" when applying the former measure. ' The

rule set out in Copeland v. Copeland6 1 that a determination of present value should be made when valuing unmatured pension benefits
was decidedly not inflexible. The supreme court in Ridgway said that

there is no certainty to future benefits derived from a profit-sharing
plan because those benefits are contingent upon the success or failure
of the business.6 6 In Ridgway, present value could not be determined
because the evidence failed to show an ascertainable future benefit.
In contrast, in Copeland, a state retirement plan clearly producing an

ascertainable value of future benefits mandated application of the
56. For a recent case applying this method to vested but unmatured benefits see Rogers
v. Rogers, 45 Or. App. 885, 609 P.2d 877 (1980). The opinion contains a meritorious discussion of the various approaches to disposition of retirement monies.
57. For a discussion of this factor, pointing out that it requires a subjective judgment in
the choice of an annual interest rate, see Projector, Valuation of Retirement Benefits in Marriage Dissolutions, 50 L.A. B. J. 229, at 231-33 (1975).
58. 50 L.A. B. J., supra note 57, at 233-35.
59. 50 L.A. B. J., supra note 57, at 235-37.
60. See Wetzel v. Wetzel, 35 Wis. 2d 103, 150 N.W.2d 482 (1967); Troutenko v. Troutenko, 503 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974); Kruger v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413,
354 A.2d 340 (1976). See also note 69 infra.
61. See Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, supra note 2, at 245.
62. Id.
63. While the supreme court approved of the use of undiscounted current actual value
under the particular facts in Ridgway, it did not rule that it would be improper to discount
the current actual value. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. at 347, 610 P.2d at 751.
64. In a footnote to the opinion the supreme court noted a dictionary definition of
"present value" which refers to the amount required which if invested at a certain interest
rate would produce a desired yield. 94 N.M. at 346, 610 P.2d at 750 n. 1. Reducing a future
payment to its present value is also referred to as discounting, the procedure for which is described in relation to retirement plans in Projector, Valuation of Retirement Benefits in Marriage Dissolutions, supra note 57.
65. 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978).
66. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. at 347, 610 P.2d at 751.
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present value method.6 7 Thus, the supreme court in Ridgway concluded that the present value method must be applied where that
value is ascertainable by substantial evidence. If not, then the current
actual value method may be applied. 6 I
The tax consideration in Ridgway is that, as the husband earns the
money he uses to pay on the note, it will be taxed as ordinary income. Furthermore, any benefits eventually received by him under
the profit-sharing plan will also be taxed upon receipt,6 9 thereby
subjecting him to double taxation. On the other hand, unlike in an
alimony situation,7" the wife may end up not being taxed at all on
monies received pursuant to a division of community property.7
The husband argued vigorously that the trial court reached an inequitable result by using the undiscounted current actual value
method and requiring payment pursuant to a promissory note. 7 2
Since the wife's half of the plan benefits were allocated to her by
way of promissory note payments, she would receive a right to the
present use of cash, whereas the value of the husband's interest was
contingent 7 and in future use. The husband's interest in the plan
benefits was contingent upon the success or failure of the business.
67. Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99 (1978).
68. Ridway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. at 347, 610 P.2d at 751.
69. I.R.C. § 402(a). Deferred compensation benefits are taxable as ordinary income or
at capital-gains rates depending on such conditions as whether the benefits are received over
a period of time or in a lump-sum and whether paid on account of the employee's death or
separation from employment. See Hughes, Community Property Aspects of Profit-Sharing
and Pension Plans in Texas-Recent Development and Proposed Guidelines for the Future,
44 Tex. L. Rev. 860 (1966).
70. I.R.C. § 71(a)(1) provides for inclusion of alimony and separate maintenance payments in the wife's gross income.
71. When a husband satisfies his wife's vested interest in his profit-sharing plan out of
his other assets this would constitute a division of a community property asset that is generally not taxable. However it is more likely that the transfer of interest will be treated as
an assignment of her right to receive future taxable income or as a termination of "her employment" and will give rise to ordinary tax treatment in the first instance and capital-gains
treatment under the latter. For a discussion of these and other similar tax consequences see
Hughes, Community Property Aspects of Profit-Sharingand Pension Plans in Texas-Recent
Developments and ProposedGuidelines for the Future, supra note 69, at 881-84.
72. Brief-in-Chief of Appellant at 13-15 and Reply Brief of Appellant at 5, 6, Ridgway
v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980).
73. While the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that there is no certainty to benefits in
a profit-sharing plan as they are contingent upon the success or failure of the business operation, it also recognized that here the benefits were vested but unmatured. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. at 347, 610 P.2d at 751. In other words, while the benefits were nonforfeitable, the employee did not have an unconditional right to them. He could reach them only
upon termination of his employment with SEMCO, retirement at age 65, or upon death. See
note 10 supra and Reply Brief for Appellant at 3. The trial court agreed with the opinion of
petitioner's counsel that the plan was supported by SEMCO stock so that in the event the
stock became worthless nothing would be left to distribute as benefits to anyone. Record,
vol. 3, at 23.
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The profit-sharing plan was supported by SEMCO stock and small
amounts of cash, 7 so that if the business collapsed and the stock
became worthless there might be nothing left to distribute. The husband had only future use value because he did not have an unconditional right to receive the benefits, but instead he could receive benefits presently only if he went so far as to terminate his employment
with SEMCO. 7 s If SEMCO stock became worthless after he had fully
paid off the wife's interest from his future earnings then he would receive nothing from the plan either for his share of the community interest or as reimbursement for the wife's share which he paid. While
it is true that there is no requirement that each spouse receive exactly
7
the same dollar value from a plan, 6 it seems that a better method of
valuation or division might have been used to limit or avoid this inequality.7
Had the trial court in Ridgway chosen to use the "pay as it comes
in" method, it still could have used undiscounted current actual value
to firmly establish the value of the wife's interest; the tax problem,
however, could have been avoided by distribution of net after-tax
7
benefits to both spouses. " By using this method the court also
would have avoided the inequity of giving the wife a present use in
cash while the husband retained future use value, because each
spouse would receive equal cash benefits at the same time.
CONCLUSION
In Ridgway, the New Mexico Supreme Court expanded 7the conIt apcept of community property to include profit-sharing plans.
plan
the
of
value
actual
current
undiscounted
proved the use of
use
the
endorsed
also
It
ascertained.
be
cannot
value
where present
of a promissory note in favor of the wife and secured by a lien on the
74. Record, voL 2, at 90.
75. To assume that because of the husband's option to receive the benefits upon termination of employment he has a present use value would be to assume that he was going to
quit his job immediately. He would be penalized for not quitting immediately by not receiving equal treatment unless he did so. Brief for Appellant, at 9-10.
76. Sparks v. Sparks, 84 N.M. 267, 502 P.2d 292 (1972). A disparity in dollar value
might not be acceptable if the method of division was not the best suited under the circumstances.
77. See text at note 80 infra.
78. In Ridgway, the trial court stated that tax consequences were not considered because at the time of the hearing on the merits no evidence regarding tax consequences was
submitted. Record, vol. 3, at 22.
79. The broad proposition that retirement pay is a form of employee compensation,
which if earned during coverture became community property, was held in LeClert v.
LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 236, 453 P.2d 755, 756 (1969). It was not extended specifically to
profit-sharing plans untilRidgway. 94 N.M. at 347, 610 P.2d at 751.
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husband's separate property where neither the community nor the
employee spouse had sufficient assets for an immediate division. The
court could have reached a more equitable result, however, either by
discounting the current actual value for taxes and other relevant and
calculable factors prior to execution of the promissory note or by
distributing the undiscounted current actual value on a "pay as it
comes in" system." 0
Future treatment of pension and profit sharing plans will require
continued development of a flexible approach to valuation and division of plan benefits because of the broad range of plans in existence.
Adaptability is especially important in valuation due to the numerous contingencies which may be involved, some of which are so remote and incalculable as to preclude present or current valuation altogether. 8 To reach just and equitable results, the courts must be
aware of available alternatives and must carefully consider selection
of the method of allocation best suited to the particular facts of each
case.
TIBO J. CHAVEZ, JR.

80. See note 63 supra.
81. See Projector, Valuation of Retirement Benefits in Marriage Dissolutions, supra note
57, at 237.

